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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~1ARY .JANE 0. KLOEPFER 
' Plaintiff and Appella1d, 
vs. 
CONT1NEKTAL ASSrRAKCE 
CO:\lPANY, 
[)efn/d((/it rrnd n!'.'-/>lldcnt. 
Case No. 
12179 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT, 
COXTIXENT AL ASSURANCE COMP ANY 
NATURE OF THI1~ CASE 
Plaintiff claims that the life of her deceased hus-
band was in:--urPd h~· defrndant at the time of her hns-
liand 's dPath on April 11, 19G8. Defendant denies the 
c-lairn and maintains, ( l) that the effective date of the 
polie~· 'ms clc>arly and unambiguously declared by tlw 
policy's terms to be May 1, 1968 and (2) assuming argu-
e>rnlo that the effective date of the policy as agreed to by 
the parties could have preceded Kloepfer's death, the 
policy does not provide insurance coverage for his death 
he>cause the required premium was not paid nor the re-
quirement of payment waived. 
1 
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DISP081TlOX IX THE LUWER corRT 
Tht> cast> was hPard in tlw lowPr ('ourt on .:\lotions 
by both partiPs for 8mnmar:· ,JnJgrnPnt. JfasPd upon 
tlw stipulations of thP partiPs, writt(•n 11H•rnorandmus 
presented to the rourt and argm1wnts, the court Pntt>rt•d 
JUdt,'1m·nt in favor of clefrnclo.nt, hol<ling that fop plain-
tiff's clec<'asecl lrnshand \ms not insun•d Jn· <l(·frnclant at 
the timP of his cleatli. 
RELIEF SOFOHT OX APPEAL 
Defendant-Rt>spondt>nt, Contirn•ntal ,\ssuranc<' Coll!-
pany, seeks affirmance of tlw judg11wnt of thP low<>r 
rourt. 
STATEMEN'l1 OF FACTS 
For the purpost>s of rlaril'ication, thP <lPf(·mlant 
wishes to highlight two assPrtions in thP plaintiff's ;;.;tatP-
ment of facts with which it particular!)' disagT<'t'S. First, 
although the relationship of Eldon Jos<'ph Kloepfor to 
thP Kloepft>r Construction Company is iwither rt>vPah·d 
by tht> record nor relPvant to this action, defrn<lant lw-
lievPs that thP deceasPd owm•cl at l<'ast thP rnajorit:· 
interest and perhaps all the interest in the prosperous 
Kloepfer Construction Company. Second, plaintiff has 
misconstrued the policy evidenced by Exhibit D. The 
policy itself statei:-; that the sole principals thPreto are 
the defendant and the National Aeronautic Ai:-;soeiation. 
The record re>vt>als that Eldon .Joseph Kloepfer by 
an application dated March 30, 19GS applied for insur-
ance coveragP 11nd(-lr a group lifr immraneP ])Olicy then 
2 
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m effoct lwtwPc·n thP dPf<>ndant anrl the National Aero-
1iautie Assoeiation. limrwdiatel~' ahove the deceased's 
signatm·p appParwl thP following: 
S. I ht·rPhy appl>· to C'Ot\TTNENTAL AS-
~rRAXC'E COMP ANT for insnrance nndPr 
Group Lif<' lwmra11ce Policy iss11ed to the N11-
tio11nl .Aeronautic Associatio11 of which I am a 
11a·mher. I agrPe that the ahovP answPrs arP corn-
plPtP and true to tht> hest of rnv knowlPd<rp and 
• r:i 
lwlit>f. I 1wdersfr/ild thut this ii1s1tra11cc shull ue-
co111e effecti1·e ollly i11 accordailcc irith the pro-
cisio11s of s11ch Gro11p Policy. (Emphasis added) 
(Ex. C; Rt>cord p. 16) 
Th<· applieant diPd in tlw crash of a privat<> plane 
late i11 the evening of April 11, 1968. (Tr. p. 261, 11.19-20). 
On April 11, 1968 the group policy administrator, 
( 'harlPs 0. Finlt'y & Company, Ine., mailed to the appli-
c·ant an 011velope containing a letter (Ex. A; Record p. 3), 
a ('!·rtifieatP of lnsnrane<' (Ex. B: RPCord p. 4) and a 
Xoti(·P of Pn·mium (Ex. E; Record p. 68). 
At thP top of tht' first page of the Certificate of 
I nsmarn·(•, tlit• 1iartit"s to tlw group life policy as well as 
tlH· poli<'~· whosp tenn1-1 eontrolled were idPntified in this 
I a ngnagP : 
C'<·rtificat<c• of Insurance issued under the terms 
of Gronp Lift' Insurance Policy No. L 25949 insur-
irw thP ~frmb<c•rs of National Aeronautic Associa-n 
tion. (Ex. B; Record p. 4) 
TlH~ group policy rpfrrn·d to in hoth dect>ased's appli-
<·ation and in thP C<'rtifieat<· of Insurance was Group 
3 
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Life Insurance Polie.'· Xo. L :25~)-!9 issm•d to First Xa-
tional Bank of .Jiimwapolis, TrnstP(' of thP Xational 
~\eronautic Association (J roup [nsm·ane(' Trust. (Ex. 
D ; Record pp. 17 -43) 
The group polic.'» at PagP LP 5;19~~)6 aG (R+>conl p. 
30) 8pecifies the date8 at which coverage ma>· com11wncc· 
for individuals to be insurPd nnd1c·r tlw group polic)- in 
this language : 
Each Individual eligible for insnram·1· h(•n·-
under who makes writte>n request to tlH· Policy-
holder, on the Company's forms, to partiripatt> in 
the insurance under this polic>·· and makes thP 
required payment of premium, if an», shall lw-
come insured subject to the following eonditions: 
(A) Each 8Uch Individual rnnst furnish, 
without expense to the Company, P\·idPnee 
of insurability satisfactory to it lwfore }w 
may become insured. If snch PvideneP is sub-
mitted, and payment of the required pri·minrn 
made, if any, the Individual's insurance slwlJ 
become effective on the first of the insurance 
month coinciding with or ne.rt succeedinq the 
date the Company determines the evidence to 
be satisfactory. (Emphasis added) 
The reference date from which in8urancP months 
shall hr eomputPd is stated in the group policy at Page 
LP 53936 G (Record p. 23) as follows: 
This policy shall be effectivt> from 12 :01 a.111. 
Standard Time, at the Polic>·holder's address. 011 
the 1st day of December, 1966, which date shall be 
its date of issue, for a term of one year, from 
which date all insurance months and years shall 
be computed. (Emphasis added) 
4 
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The letter of April 11, 1968 addressed to the appli-
('ant from tliP .~dministrator of the National Aeronautic 
.\:~'-'nciation <lroup Lifr Insurance Program, consistent 
\l'ith th(• effrctive clatt> polie~· provisions quoted above, 
inforn1<·d tlw ap1Jlicant that the compan~· had as of that 
<la~e cletermined the evidence of insurability to be satis-
factory and that coverage under the group policy became 
dfrctin ~la~· 1. 19<iS. (Ex. A; Record p. 3) The Certifi-
('ah· of Insnrane<• also stated in hold print in th<:> upper 
ldt hand eornt>r of the first page that the eff PctivP dateo 
was )i[a~· 1, 196S. (Ex. B; RN·ord p. 4) 
Looking nm\· to the proYisions concerning payment 
of' prernil~m, dPC'eased's application in bold print on a 
rP<1 haekground immediately b€'neath applicant's signa-
ttff" stated as follows: 
PLEASE DO NOT ENCLOSE CHECK 
'VITH THIS APPLICATION - A STATE-
~IEKT \VILL BE ENCLORED \VITH YOUR 
POLICY. (Ex. C; Record p. 16) 
ThP group policy requires premiums to h<:> paid m 
adyanc<· in this language: 
12 PAYMENT OF PRT~l\IIUMS 
Premiums shall he pa~rable at tht> Home 
Offict> of the Company or to a duly authorized 
agent of the Company in exchang~ for the Com-
pany's receipt signed by the Pres1dent or. Secre-
tarv and countersigned by the Agent designated 
the~ein. Premiums are payable annually in ad-
vance but with the consent of the Company may 
be paid semi-annually, quarterly or monthly in 
advanct> in accordance with the Schedule of Rates 
contained hf'rein. (Ex. D, p. LP 53936 G-6; Record 
p. 36) 
5 
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Thf' prt>mimn notice rnailPd to deeeased on A~pril 11, 
19G8 statf'd that th<:' premium due datf' was )ifa.Y 1, 191)8. 
(Ex. E; Record p. 68) 
Even the plaintiff has admitt<>d that pa.''1nrnt of tl11• 
premium was a condition of tht' policy which had to lw 
satisfied before the covf'rage wonld he in t>ffect. (Tr. p. 
15, I. 28; p. 16, 11. 28-30) 
As for a gracf' period on the pa)11wnt of Jll'Plllinrn 
both the Certificate of Insurance mailed to d<>e(•asPd and 
the group poliey contain the following langnagP: 
A grace period of thirty-on!-' cla:·:-, without 
interest charge, shall be granted for tlH· pPriocl of 
every premium, after the first, during \\·hieh j)('l'-
iod the insurance shall continue in fore(•, hut in 
case of a claim during such grace period, an:· onr-
due premium will be deducted from th<· amount 
of insurance in settlement. (Ex. D, p. LP 5;)9:ili 
G-6; Record p. 36: Ex. B ; Record p. 5) 
The only premium tendPred to tht> def Pndant hnein 
was by a check dated l\Iay 7, 19GS ap1waring in Ex. K 
(Record p. 68), which cht>ck was rnailPd to thP gr01l)l' 
poliey Administrator and reef'ived som<'tirnt- aftPr ~[a:" 
7, 19GS. Tlw dt>fendant refmwd tlw tPnd<'r. 
ARGUMEN11 
POINT I 
THE TERM "INSURANCE MONTH" AND OTHER 
TERMS CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF 
COVERAGE UNDER THE GROUP POLICY ARE 
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND HENCE THE 
DECEASED APPLICANT IS BOUND THEREBY. 
6 
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Tlw plaintiff's claim that tlw t('rrns concerning the 
(•ffretin· datP of COYPrag(• arp amhignon8 is not supported 
Ii;. tlH· faets. Th(' term "in8urance month" is used 
thrnughout hoth the Certificak of Insurance (E~x. B; 
H<·eord JllJ. -t-12) mailed to the de-ceased and the Group 
Li fr IrnmrancP Policy, Number L 25949 (Ex. D; Record 
pp. 17-+8) with its meaning clearly declared in the group 
policy itself, for on page LP 63936 G, the front page 
of the group policy (Record p. 23), the term "insurance 
rnonth'' is dPfined thusly: 
This policy shall Ji,, effectin' from 12 :01 A.M. 
~tandard Tirnt>, at tht> Polic:·holder's address, on 
the 1st day of December, 19fl6, which date shall 
bt> its date of issne, for a term of one :·ear, .from 
u'hich date all insurance years and months shall 
l;c compided. (Emphasis added) 
This language clearl:· indicates that the term "insur-
ance month'' means any one month period beginning on 
tlw sarnt> cla:· on whirh the qroup policy became effective 
which in this particular i)olicy happened to coincide with 
tllP first day of th<' ralendar month. 
I<~xarnination of hoth the Certificate (Ex. B) and 
thP Group Polic:· (Ex. D) reveals that both are basic 
fonns which haYe been adapted for use in the particular 
}JOlicy herP at issuf>. The term ''insurance month" was 
oh\·ionsly usPd throughout these documents to concisely 
<·x1n·pss the ahoYe statf>d concept of an insurance month. 
rrhis analysis of the provisions of the controlling 
group policy reveals that the meaning of the term "in-
surance month'' is clear and unambiguous. 
7 
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This court has affirmed the princivl(' fu11<lanw11tal 
to contract law that contracting varties will }w held to 
their clear and understandable language deliberately 
eommited to writing and endorsed by them as signatories 
thereto. 1 
In J.llofrad v. New York Life l11s. Co., 20G F.2d .JDl 
(10th Cir. 1953), the following principle was ennnciat<•<l: 
... 'A contract of insurance n•sb upon nnd 
is controlled by the same principle of law appli-
cable to any other contract. ·what the contracting 
parties intended, mutually agreed to, and their 
minds met upon is the measure of their obliga-
tions.' [citations omitted] And if the intentions 
of the parties are clear from an examination of 
the contractual documents this court will not re-
write the contract. 2 
Applying the principle here, according to the ckar 
and unambiguously expressed intent of the policy's pro-
visions the effective date had to be May 1, 1968, rather 
than April 1 or April 11. Because of the clear meaning of 
these }ffovisions this court may not construe the provi-
sions to mean otherwise. 
POINT II 
THE APPLICANT AND THE DEFENDANT HAD 
THE POWER TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTIVE 
DATE OF INDIVIDUAL COVERAGE. THE DE-
FENDANT HAD A LEGAL DUTY TO CLEARLY 
SPECIFY THE EFFECTIVE DATE AND DID NOT 
ACT ARBITRARILY IN SO DOING. 
1]ensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 (1958). 
2206 F.2d 491, 493; Accord: Jones v. New York Life Ins. Co., 
69 Utah 172, 253 Pac. 200, 202 (1927); White v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 63 Utah 272, 224 Pac. 1106, 1108 (1924). 
8 
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1'he Utah Supreme Conrt ha::-; repeatedly held that 
Ji;~rties to an insnranc<~ IJOlic.\· ma.\· provide in an applica-
'(ion at what tiirn• and under what conditions a policy is 
to become effective and hinding. 3 
JrnlePcl, rtaJ1 law now n•quires tltat Pach policy 
i :--::-:nt>d shall specify "the time at which the insurance 
t hrreunder takes effect. . .. '' 4 Thus, not only are the 
ptrtit>s to an insnranct> policy permitted to determint> 
'J1p effretin date of the policy hut under the law of this 
stat<• th<~ polie.\· must state the effective time. 
ln the instant eas<', boti1 the group policy and the 
C'<>rtificat<, of Insurance set forth the first day of an 
insmaneu month as the only date npon which the insur-
ance could takP effect. Paragraph 2 of the General Pro-
visions on page LP 53936 aG of the group policy states 
a~ follows: 
Each individual eligible for insurance here-
under who makes written request to the policy-
holder, on the Company's forms, to participate in 
the insurance under this Policy, and makes tlw 
required pa_\'ment of premium, if any, shall be-
comf> insured subject to the following conditions: 
(A) Each such Individnal must furnish. 
without expense to the Company evidence 
of insnrability satisfactory to it before he 
may become insured. If such evidence is sub-
mitted, and payment of the reqitircd premium 
made, if any, the lndi11idual's insu,rance slwll 
become effective on the first of the insurance 
month coinciding with or next succeeding the 
Jjones v. New York Life Ins. Co., 69 Utah 172, 254 Pac. 200, 
202 (1927); White v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 63 Utah 272, 
224 Pac. 1106 (1924); Sterling v. Lodge, 28 Utah 505, 80 Pac. 375 
(1905). 
4§ 31-19-11 (2) (e) Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
9 
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date the company detennines the evidence to 
be satisfactory. (Record p. 30) 
Similar language referring to tlH• fin;t of an msm·-
ance month as the effodiYe date for eoverage under 
certain circumstances is found on the front pagt> of tlw 
Certificate of Insurance. (Ex. B; Record p. 4) 
Since, as explained in POINT I above, there is no 
ambiguity in the meaning of the term "insurance month," 
it is clear that this provision states that there are only 
twelve dates every year when coverage under the grouv 
policy may bt>gin for individuals newly admitted to the 
group, i.e., the same day of the month as the day when 
the basic group policy took effect, which in this case 
was the first day of the calendar month. Furthermore, 
unless the date of the company's determination that the 
applicant's insurability is satisfactory coincides with one 
of the twelve possible effective dates, then coverage may 
not commence on the day of approval but shall be post-
poned until the next succeeding possible effective date 
- which in the instant case was May 1, 1968. 
Upon analysis it is clear that the defendant's deh>r-
mination of the effective date of coverage was in strict 
accord with both the policy's express terms and Utah 
law and not arbitrary as asserted by the plaintiff. 
10 
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POINT III 
A VALID PREREQUISITE CONDITION OF THE 
GROUP POLICY REQUIRED THAT THE PREMIUM 
BE PAID BEFORE THE POLICY COULD BECOME 
EFFECTIVE. 
Tlwn' is case law too numerous to cite exhaustively 
·which applies the principle that when an insurance policy 
sets forth conditions which must be met before it be-
eonws effective those conditions must be satified before 
tlw policy may take effect. 
The following cases are illustrative of this principle: 
In lVhitr -i· •. Metropolitan Life l11s. Co., 63 Utah 272, 
224 Pac. 1106 (1924), the insurance policy provided that 
t11e policy would not take effect until the application had 
been ''received, approved and the policy issued and de-
livered and the full first premium stipulated in the policy 
}1as actually been paid to and accepted by the company4 
during the lifrtirne of the life proposed." There the 
application had been apprOYPd and the policy delivered 
to the agPnt and payment of the premium tendered to 
the agent. However, the agent refused to accept the 
liremium upon learning that the applicant was ill. The 
applicant subsequently diPd. The Utah court held that 
the clause requiring that the premium had to be accepted 
hy the company gave it the right to rt>fuse to accept 
paymPnt and that the applicant was therPfore not in-
:,:nred. 
In lllofrad v. New York Life Ins. Co., s11pra, an 
T ranian citizen studying at B.Y.U. was killed in an auto-
11 
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mobile accident after having completed and delivered 
an application for life insurance and ha\·ing paid the first 
premium. The applicant diPd before thf' prerequisitP 
medical examination had lwen taken. ThP conrt lH•ld 
that there was no insurance contract between thP parti(•,: 
since the prerequisitP condition had not lwen met. 
In New Enqland lllutual Life Ins. Co. of Boston r. 
Hinkle, 248 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1%7), the deceasPd had 
completed and delivered to the irnmrance compan;.·':-; 
agent an application and even paid the first qnart<>r 
premium on a lifr insurancP poli<·;.· bPfon" 11e ',rn:-; kilh•d 
in an airplant> crash. Tlw polic;.· n•qnired a 11wdin1l 
<·xamination satisfactory to the company before the pol-
icy would be effecti\·e. The df'ceasPd had not had a nwd-
ical examination. The court held that the prerequisitP 
condition of a medical examination had not been satisfied 
so, therefore, the deceased's life was not insured. 
As quoted in defendant's StatemPnt of Facts, thP 
group policy required that individual coverage would 
not become effective until tlw cornpan~· had deterrninPd 
that thf' evidence of insurability was satisfactory and 
tlw prf'rnium had been paid. Only when those prerequi-
site conditions had been met could coverage become effee-
tive on the first of the next succeeding insurance month. 
No payment was tendered to defendant or its agent 
until sometime after May 7, 1968. This breach of the 
prepayment of premium requirement is of itself snffi-
ciPnt to support the District Court's judgment. 
12 
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POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO GRACE PERIOD APPLICABLE 
TO THE FIRST PREMIUM. 
Plaintiff by a tortuous and completely illogical con-
struction of the English language claims that paragraph 
13, on page LP 53936 G-6 of the General Provisions of 
the group policy, referring to a grace period of "thirty-
one days ... after the first" refers to the first of the 
insurance month. 
N onnal rules of English construction require one to 
find tlw noun reference of the adjective "first" within 
the sentence in which it is used. Applying that rule, which 
i::s buttressed by common sense, one can see that that 
1 iaragraph simply provides that after the payment of 
the fir.~d premium there shall be a grace period of thirty-
one days for the pa)71Ilent of any succeeding premiums. 
This conclusion is firmly supported by comparing 
the language in question with the language of U.C.A., 
~ 31-23-8, which provides as follows: 
31-23-8. Grace period.-The group life insnr-
nce policy shall contain a provision that the polic)·-
holder is entitled to a grace period of thirty-one 
days for the payment of any premium due PJ:;cept 
the first, during which grace period the death 
benefit coverage shall continue in force, unless 
the policyholder shall have given the insnre-r writ-
ten notice of discontinuance and in accordance 
with the terms of the policy. The policy may pro-
vide that the policyholder shall he liable to the 
insurer for the payment of the prorata premimn 
for the time the policy was in force during such 
grace period. (Emphasis added) 5 
5 Cf. ~ 31-22-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
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Tlw grollp polic:·'s grace period proYision eornpliPs 
in substantiv<'ly id<>ntical lanµ;nagt' with the grace period 
required by Utah la"·· No'.dl<'l'<' in tlw Ftah stat11tPs is 
there any reference to a first of an insurance month. 
Nnrely the plaintiff does not claim that the word ''first" 
as in tlw statutory phrase "exePpt tlw first" refers to 
a first of an i usu rru1cr' m ontl1 ! 
Assuming, arguendo, the grace period was applicahl<· 
to payment of the first premium, plaintiff's own reason-
ing seeks to establish the effective date as April 1, 1968, 
which would make the duP datP l\Iay 1, 1 !Hi8. Tlw check 
tendered by plaintiff was dated l\Iay 7, 1968 and not 
received by defendant until several days after l\Iay 7, 
19GS and thPrefore was fatally untimel:· to plaintiff's 
claim even accepting plaintiff's premise. 
As diseussed in POINT III, the contractual prerequi-
site condition that the policy premium be paid before thL• 
policy could beconw effective is Yalid and binding. 
The policy prm1iurn was not tender<'d to defendant 
until more than three w<:>eks aftf'l' the date of the appli-
cant's demise and at lPast one week after the premium 
due date of l\Iay 1, 1968. rriw principles discussed in 
POINT IIT declarP that this failnn' alon<' is sufficient 
to support thP District Court's ruling. 
POINT V 
THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER IS NOT APPLIC-
ABLE TO THIS SITUATION. 
As a gPneral rule, the doctrinP of waiver, both as 
to eff1::•ctiye date and as to pa:·rnent of JH'eminm, is 
14 
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utilized in contractual rnatfrn; only when a varty does 
not specifi!'ally state the (•ffect intenckd bv his act. One 
. . 
a uthori t>· stafrs this pr inc~i pie as follows: 
... [I] 11 the alJsencc of anything :;aid or done 
lJy the insurer's agcut wheu ddivcri11g the policy 
relative to tlw postponement of the effecti,·e date 
thereof, it becomes valid at that time regardlt•ss 
of the fact that the insured may die the following 
day. (Emphasis added) 6 
However, here tht• eompany agent clParly indicated 
111 the letkr aeeompanying the Certificate of Insurance 
and on tlw Certifieate of Insnranee that coverage under 
the group policy was not to take effect until May 1, 1968. 
Fnrtlwnnon', recall here the discussion in POINT I 
of tlw Ftah case;-; 1d1ich unequivocally establish that 
parties to an insurance agrPPment may agree upon the 
('ffectiw date of the policy. If this court were to find a 
waiver of t-ither the payment of premium requirement or 
the stated effeetive date of .May 1, this would be in effect 
a rnling that not\\·ithstanding an>·thing said or done by 
(•itlwr party to an>· insurance contract, the effective date 
of any insmanee poliey wonld be as a matter of law the 
date upon which it is delivered to the insured. Such 
a ruling would be directly contrary to both the established 
Jaw of Ptah and the general prineiple on waiver quot€'d 
above. Nor is then' any sound reason why this general 
rule should be established. No public poliey requires the 
Pstahlishment of sueh a rule. 
Plaintiff eites the ease of Loftis r. Pacific .:lhttual 
Life Ins. Co., 38 Utah 532, 114 Pac. 134 (1911) to support 
6Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 138. 
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his statement that an insurer may waive its right to a 
prennum. 
The facts in the Loftis case wen· these. The deceasl•d 
was covered under a group policy then in effect and two 
premium payments had been paid by payroll deduction 
from dPceased's check. The policy provided that if tlw 
premium for any particular period wen• not paid, coyer-
age m1der the group policy would lapsP. By agreement, 
the only permitted method of payment was payroll dP-
duction. At the due date of the next pn'mium, tlw 
deceased had not earned Pnough to cover thl' premium, 
hence it was not paid. On the following due date, the 
defendant insurance company notified the employer of 
the amount of prPmium then due on deceased's insuranc(' 
who just recently had been killed. \Yhen the employer 
tendered the premium the insurance company by then 
having learned of the death refused the premium and 
claimed thl' policy had lapsed. Tlw insurance company 
had accepted thP premiums on othPr li,·ing employees 
under otherwise identical circumstances, i.e., past duP 
premiums due to inadequate earnings and subsequent 
billing of the employer by the insurance company for 
the past due premiums. Those facts were submitted to 
tl1P jury, who found a waiver. On appeal, the defendant 
urged that as a matter of law there was no waiver. This 
court affirmed the district court on the grounds that a 
waiver may be found if a course of conduct by the com-
pany or authorized agent induced a reasonably founded 
and honest belief that strict compliance with the policy 
provisions would not be insisted upon. Note that this 
rnle is consistent with the rules relied on by defendant. 
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Unlike the Loftis case, the parties here precisely 
stated when and under what conditions the policy was to 
take effect. There was never expressed any intent to 
waive either the requirement that the premium be paid 
prior to the insurance hecoming effective or the stated 
effective date of l\iay 1, 1968. Indeed, the express intent 
was clearly to the contrary. 
Relative to the payment of the prPmium, the applica-
tion (•ompleted by applicant specifically provided that 
no premium was to he enclosed in the application. The 
elt>ar implication being that a notice of premium would 
be sent lati"'r if the company accepted the applicant. En-
('losed in the same envelope with the Certificate of Insur-
ance and the letter stating tlw dfective date of the policy 
to be May L 1968, was a Notice of Premium indicating 
that the premium was due May 1, 1968. The defendant 
contends that undt>r tl1t'se circumstances for this court 
to hold that there was a waiver would totally disregard 
the right of the parties to contract and totally disregard 
their intent as cl<:>arly expressed in the documents in eYi-
dence before the court. 
Finally, this court in Jones v. New York Life Ins. 
Co., 69 Utah 172, 253 Pac. 200, 203 (1927), a situation 
identical in all relevant and material respects to the 
instant one, has already held that the doctrine of waiver 
is not herf' applicable. 
In the Jones case-, the poliC)' stated that before it 
would be in pffect it must he delivered, the premium 
paid and the applicant must not liavc cons1lltcd or been 
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treafrd b.1J a phys icia 11 smcc 7z is medical examinatio It. 
After taking th(' insuranct> medical Pxamination, thP 
applicant contracted spinal meningitis for whieh ht' was 
treated by a ph.'·sician and from which he subsequently 
di<>d. The premium had been paid and the agent had 
delivered tlw policy Pven though he knew of the appli-
cant's subsequent treatment b.'· a ph.'·sician. The plain-
tiff tried to claim the delivery constituted a waiver of 
the relevant condition. This court held that the doctrine 
of waiver was not there applicable, stating that thP th0ory 
of wain1 r nPcPssairly prPsupposl'd in that instance thP 
existence of a valid contract and that since there was 
no contract there was no waiver of the contract terms. 
For the reasons sc->t out above, it must be concludPd 
that under the circumstances of the instant case, mere 
delivery of a certificate of insurance was not a waiver 
of either the stated effective date or the requirement 
that the premium be paid prior to or on the c->ffective date. 
CONCLUSTOX 
Tlw law and the undisputed facts as set forth ahovP 
unequivocall.'· d(·monstrate that the provisions of tlw 
polic.'· were clear and not ambiguous, that these provi-
sions Wt'I'P within the parties' powPr to agree to, that 
tlw provisions are lawful and not to bP reformed by any 
eonrt, that the conditions prerPqnisite to the policy taking 
effact had been nt-ither satisfi<>d nor waived and conse-
qn!:'ntl.'·, tht> applicant's lifr was not insnrPd by the de-
fendant at tht> time of his untinwly and nnfortunat(' 
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dvath. For tht>se l'Pasons, tlw District Conrt's judgment 
:-;hould lw affirnwd. 
HA TED this ____________________ da.v of ________________________ , 1969. 
Resrwctfull)' submitted, 
JONES, vVALDO, H OL-
BROOK &.McDONOUGH 
By ___________________________________________________ _ 
vV. Robert ~Wright 
By ___________________________________________________ _ 
G. Randall Klimt 
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